10th July 2026

More Hut 8 than Number 10 

Manchester may yet have another lesson to learn from Alan Turing. 

 

The familiar version of Turing’s Manchester story is about computing. After the war, he came to the University of Manchester and played a key part in the city’s contribution to the development of the modern digital age. It is one of our great stories of invention, carried forward through the Baby, the first stored-program computer, and the wider emergence of modern computing. 

 

There is another Turing story though. I’ve no idea where I heard it, and I may be stretching the symbolism somewhat, but it keeps coming back to me when I think about the task now facing a gang of my ex-colleagues from Stockport and GM days.  

 

In my telling, it goes a bit like this: before Manchester, there was Bletchley. And inside Bletchley, there was Hut 8…

Hut 8 was Turing’s workspace in the Bletchley Park system. Bletchley was part of the Government Code and Cypher School and, ultimately, the Foreign Office. Access and communications were controlled because its work was both secret and vital. 

 

Bletchley was close enough to power to have impact and far enough from ordinary departmental life for different habits to form.  

 

Within Bletchley, Hut 8 created a further layer of distance and focus. A small group of people with rare and different skills; acting a couple of steps removed from power, but with connections when needed; and lots of operating space but no endless budgets. This mix allowed them (and others) to develop methods that did not yet fit neatly into the wider system. 

 

I think we should take some of these lessons to heart in the design of the new No. 10 North, starting with three ideas in particular. 

 

1 – Strategic distance 

 

The first idea is strategic distance. 

 

No. 10 North will need access to decisions, people, money, evidence and political authority. It will need to be taken seriously by the civil service, media, business and political leadership. It will also need to decide, very early, how people get access to it. 

 

Whitehall will not ignore its new northern cousin, especially if it operates under the close watch of the Deputy PM. The more likely risk is that the centre will do what the centre does: bring it into the flow. Brief it, seek to staff it, copy it in, invite it along, seek its view, ask for a steer, offer support, and slowly make it part of the usual pattern of business. 

 

Most of that will be well intentioned and some of it will be useful, but all of it carries a time and attention cost. 

 

The trappings of the state can be an attractive distraction. The meetings in the actual Number 10 and the photo by the big black door. The urgent submission. The flattering request for advice on the big question of the day. The all-hours work at moments of national significance. All feed on the sense that proximity is the same as influence. 

 

No. 10 North will need some of this win friends and influence people. But it needs a conscious strategy about how it will avoid being organised by it. 

 

Civil servants are very good at making new things legible to the system – a useful skill to create order, accountability and systems that scale. It also has a habit of abstracting and codifying insurgent energy, making new things feel familiar faster than is good for them. Devolution – itself such a promising innovation – now has some of this quality: still important, still developing, but increasingly contained within statutory routes, frameworks, assurance processes and programme boards. 

 

The interfaces with Whitehall need to be designed deliberately. No. 10 North should have clear routes into the centre, and clear rules about when those routes are used. It should also have clear outward faces routes to place work in the MSA sector and across universities, think tanks and other partners, to seed experiments and protect them as they play out. 

 

Strategic distance also means using its location to invert the usual pattern of dispersed government agencies: it’s usually the workers that move out of London, leaving the head office logic in Whitehall. No. 10 North should ensure that senior leadership, commissioning power and political attention sit in Manchester, but it can draw on specialist virtual teams from wherever they are based. 

 

The scarce thing in government is authority, attention and the ability to set the problem. No. 10 North needs to safeguard carefully steward this institutional capital. 

 

Enabling constraints 

 

The second lesson is about the enabling power of constraints.  

 

This might sound counterintuitive, because most conversations about new institutions start with freedoms. What powers should it have? What systems can it access? What teams should it commission? What levers will it pull? 

 

But a small number of priorities, a tight mission, a clear test for taking on work and a way to refuse things that are interesting but adjacent, are hugely empowering in a bureaucracy.   

 

Government often struggles because work materialises from everywhere. A minister asks for something. A department seeks a view. A stakeholder needs reassurance. A board wants an update. A risk needs to be managed. This is how the work gets wider and slower without anyone making a bad decision. 

 

No 10 North should have a visible operating discipline. It should know what is in scope, what is out of scope, who can commission the team, how decisions are made, how learning is captured, and how quickly work is either advanced, stopped or handed on. 

 

Limit work in progress. This is recognisably lean agile territory (which the new Deputy Chief of Staff will recognise from some of the ways we worked at Stockport Council.) 

A government department will never be pure agile terrain – politics, accountability, consultation, scrutiny and public money all change the methods – but the instincts and tools still have massive value: set a direction, work openly, learn quickly, keep improving, and do not pretend that a complex system can be designed perfectly at the start. 

 

No 10 North could bring that discipline into the centre of government. It could make constraint a feature of the model. Fewer priorities. Better questions. Shorter routes between decision and learning. More focus on what places can actually use. 

 

Multi-disciplinary teams 

 

Hut 8 is a useful reminder that hard problems sit between disciplines. The breakthrough is never a clever person in a room, it comes from working arrangements that allow different forms of expertise to come into useful contact.  

 

This is one of the things that Combined Authorities can do really well – flatter structures, more collaborative, and bringing the edges and the centre together as peers. This has been a strong working practice in much of the GMCA system, particularly in its early days and in the pragmatic delivery focused culture that its current Chief Exec is known for.  

 

It will require a conscious effort from the start of the new No. 10 North to make sure that policy people, analysts, service designers, economists, investment specialists, local government operators, digital people, data people, finance people, regulators, sector experts and frontline practitioners are brought together. They all see different parts of the problem. Put them in the mix to work the questions as a team, like the whole-system policy sprints we run (see below).  

Build teams around problems in places, not around existing departmental categories. Show what works – lets others worry about how that success is accounted for. Use tours of duty, external appointments, secondments, field offices; re-shape agencies, partner with universities and Mayors.   

 

Give them clear tasks, fixed deadlines and delegated authority to make calls and run prototypes.  

 

Insurgent first, collaborative always 

 

No. 10 North will need an insurgent posture at the start because new institutions need to work double hard to form and protect their character. A bit of friction is useful while the boundaries are being drawn. 

 

Over time, I’d expect this posture to soften a little. The team can let out more line: choose, build routines with departments, and develop the trust needed to work well inside government. The best version of No. 10 North must be highly collaborative with the partners it chooses to play with.  

 

Establish the edge first, then collaborate from this firm platform. 

 

The lesson to take from the Hut 8 example is to be bounded but connected: close enough to power for the work to count, far enough from ordinary routines for different habits to form and disciplined enough to keep returning to the problem. 

 

That feels like a recipe for *doing things differently*.